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Abstract
With over 8 million Filipinos living overseas, it could be argued that people have become the country’s 
largest export commodity. With their remittances making up 13% of GDP, they are as well crucially 
important economic actors. Has the Philippine state been instrumental in this exodus and in harvesting 
its fruits? Addressing such a proposition requires further refinement of three basic concepts – state, 
diaspora and transnationalism – through the use of three structuring templates. As a preliminary, the 
dichotomy of state strength and weakness is grounded in an analysis of a particular sector, namely 
emigration. By drawing on the typologies of Robin Cohen, Filipino overseas communities are portrayed 
as possessing, to some extent, the characteristics of much more readily accepted diasporas. However, 
a sketch of the varied experience of a heterogeneous Filipino diaspora underlines the differences 
between permanent migrants, contract workers, sea-based workers and irregular migrants. The diverse 
lived experiences of these groups – and their relations with their “home” nation – call into question 
the salience of notions of “transnationalism”. This questioning is reinforced by an examination of the 
Filipino state’s role in creating a “self-serving” diaspora through a review of the three phases in Filipino 
emigration policy since 1974. The characteristics that come to the fore are rather forms of “long-
distance nationalism” and “rooted cosmopolitanism”. Taking cognizance of the multiple identities and 
loyalties in the case of the Filipino diaspora, a process of “binary nationalisms” is posited as a more 
fruitful avenue for future research. 
David Camroux
Nationalisation du transnationalisme ?
L’Etat philippin et sa diaspora
Résumé
Avec plus de 8 millions d’expatriés, la population représente la principale exportation nationale 
des Philippines. Les transferts de fonds constituent 13 % du PIB et font des expatriés des acteurs 
économiques centraux. L’Etat philippin a-t-il instrumentalisé cet exode afin d’en récolter les fruits ? 
Répondre à cette question nécessite de distinguer trois concepts fondamentaux : l’Etat, la diaspora et le 
transnationalisme. Le texte suggère que l’utilisation de la dichotomie de la force et de la faiblesse d’un 
Etat doit se fonder sur une analyse du rôle de ce dernier dans l’émigration. Les typologies de Robin 
Cohen servent par ailleurs à démontrer que les communautés philippines d’outre-mer répondent à des 
caractéristiques propres à des communautés diasporiques plus généralement reconnues. Reste qu’il 
faut s’interroger sur les expériences de cette diaspora hétérogène pour mettre en avant la distinction 
entre émigrés permanents, saisonniers, travailleurs en mer et personnes en situation irrégulière. La vie 
de ces groupes et leurs relations avec leur « mère patrie » remet en question la prédominance de la 
notion de « transnationalisme ». Cette analyse critique est renforcée par l’examen du rôle de l’Etat dans 
la création d’une diaspora instrumentalisée au cours de trois périodes de politiques d’immigration 
depuis 1974. Les caractéristiques qui ressortent de cette analyse sont des formes de « nationalisme 
longue distance » (Anderson, Schiller) et de « cosmopolitanisme enraciné » (Appiah). D’autres pistes de 
recherche plus fructueuses peuvent naître de l’exploration des multiples identités, des loyautés et dans 
le cas philippin des « nationalismes binaires ».
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Nationalizing Transnationalism? 
The Philippine State and the Filipino Diaspora
David Camroux
Sciences Po CERI
   People are now the Philippines’ largest export. The statistics are eloquent. Over 8 million 
Filipinos live overseas, i.e. 10% of the Filipino population.1 Each day they are joined by 
an average of another 3,000 of their compatriots, i.e. a flow of over a million people per 
year. When seen in relation to the workforce, the figures are even more startling: some 
7 million people out of a workforce of 32 million work overseas, i.e. 22% of the working 
population. For contemporary Filipino governments, Filipino Workers are “new national 
heroes” worthy of their own National Day. 
   The research for this extended essay began with a sense of clear certainties and with the 
unreasonable ambition of dealing with the grassroots, lived experience of Filipino emigrants, 
as well as providing some overriding interpretation of the Filipino emigration experience. 
In the course of research and writing, the preliminary certainties have been cast aside and, 
at the same time, the ambitions for this extended essay have been significantly reduced. In 
particular, the study focuses essentially on the macro level and does not attempt to analyze 
in depth the varied lived experiences of diverse Filipino communities overseas, each of 
which would require a monograph in its own right. As a result, the following has become 
a first step in a much larger project that will focus more fully on the links between Filipino 
overseas communities and their “home” country in order to contribute to an understanding 
of state-civil society relations within the Philippines. 
     1 Including several million who have taken on another nationality.
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   In the following, it is intimated that the Philippines is important per se. Above all, at the 
risk of seeming to be a cultural essentialist, within the Philippines, Western-inspired political 
structures both confront and integrate with localized forms of social and political behaviour, 
providing kaleidoscopic syntheses. Yet in making such a blatant assertion, the unintended 
implication would seem to be that of a cultural fixedness in the way in which Filipinos 
come to terms with the contemporary world both at home and abroad. Far from providing 
evidence for such an assertion, this extended essay will attempt to demonstrate the fluidity, 
adaptability and symbiosis between two kinds of social narratives: on the one hand, between 
a Filipino state and Filipino civil society, and, on the other hand, between Filipinos (both 
state and non-state actors) and a wider world. 
   A second important aspect of the following study is a salutary calling into question of 
the three major concepts that are at its heart. These are those of “state”, “diaspora” and 
“transnationalism”. In order to structure the argument, three templates drawn from the 
existing literature are used as a way of focusing attention on the Filipino case. It is suggested 
in the following that while the use of more nuanced and qualified notions of both “state” and 
“diaspora” reinforces their salience for studies of Filipino emigration, this is not the case for 
the term “transnationalism”, which, it is argued, is of very limited usefulness in describing the 
Filipino experience. On the contrary, a concept or, rather, process of “binary nationalisms” 
is posited as more appropriate in describing overseas Filipino experience.
STATES AND EmigRATioN: ThE PhiLiPPiNES AS UNExCEPTioNAL?
   Underlying the approach is an attempt to answer the call of James Hollifield (2008), echoing 
Theda Skocpol, to bring the state back into current research on migration. In doing so, this study 
is also an attempt to build on the work of a number of scholars of the Philippines (Abinales & 
Amoroso 2005; Ball 1997; Gonzalez 1998; Hawes 1989) who have made the state central 
to their analyses. While a great deal of research has been undertaken on the role of states in 
controlling entry into particular countries and the control of immigrant populations, far less 
research has been done by social scientists on the role of states in controlling both exit and, 
a fortiori, “their” populations overseas. Historically speaking, this is an anomaly. Observed 
over a longer period, states not only in Europe, but also in Asia – where both Chinese and 
Japanese emperors imposed restrictions on their subjects leaving their kingdoms – were 
much more concerned with exits rather than entries. In other words, state intervention on 
emigration has a much longer historical lineage than concerns with controlling immigration, 
a phenomenon that perhaps dates from the latter part of the nineteenth century. In looking for 
antecedents to the role of the Filipino state in both promoting emigration and then co-opting 
this emigrant population within the national polity, one needs to go back at least to Victorian 
Britain, where, in the high age of imperialism and the peopling of colonies of settlement, 
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state-orchestrated and, at times, -sponsored emigration was designed to achieve a number of 
Empire-building objectives (Murdoch 2004) as well as ridding Britain of its excess labour. It 
is from Victorian Britain that the instrumentalization of emigration as a social safety valve is 
derived, an objective which has been one of the unstated aims of the emigration policies of 
successive Filipino governments. 
   Closer to the Filipino experience are the two historical cases of Italy and Portugal. In 1911, 
roughly one-sixth of the population of the Italian peninsula lived abroad, their remittances 
providing a quarter of the balance of payments (Choate 2008). Many of the debates in 
Italy at the beginning of the twentieth century – for example on whether the reliance on 
remittances would lead to structural change in an undeveloped economy or merely be 
a crutch – find their echoes in Manila today. As in the contemporary Philippines today, 
the Italian state at the beginning of the twentieth century invested considerable resources 
in gathering, analyzing and distributing statistics on population movements. In 1901, an 
Emigration Commissariat was established, and the state took responsibility for regulating all 
aspects of the emigration experience, at least till the arrival in a foreign port (Choate 2008). 
Moreover, as in the contemporary Philippines, the Italian state relied on non-governmental 
organizations, and particularly the Catholic Church2, to mitigate some of the worst features 
of emigration by providing emigrants with some of the social goods that the government 
could but inadequately supply. In fact, the objectives of all these measures were virtually 
identical to those voiced by Filipino politicians today: “the Italian state aimed to cultivate 
loyalty and sentimentality (italianità) among all Italian expatriates in a mutually beneficial 
relationship, intervening ‘from above’ to cultivate ‘transnationalism from below’ “(Choate 
2007: 736).
   While the Italian situation from the late nineteenth century till the 1930s reflects a 
number of similarities with the Philippine case, the Portuguese experience has a number of 
dissimilarities. Above all, as Elizabeth Leeds (1985) has demonstrated in her alas unpublished 
PhD dissertation, the Portuguese state used emigration as an instrument in maintaining and 
consolidating its empire in Africa and, to a lesser extent, elsewhere. Going well into the 
fascist era, there was, however, a tension between the needs of maintaining an empire 
(such as the needs of the military) and the demands of internal economic development. 
Leeds shows how the state was compelled to negotiate, not only this contradiction, but 
also competing demands within Portugal from landowners and industrialists. These tensions 
finally become resolved with the revolution of 1974, the collapse of the Portuguese Empire 
and entry into the European Union. While, to express the obvious, the Philippines does not 
possess an empire, there is nevertheless, as also in the Portuguese example, a contemporary 
preoccupation with the diaspora as a form of projection of national power and prestige 
overseas. Anecdotally, one hears in the bitter-sweet comments on the role of Filipino nurses 
and nannies as “care-givers to the world” a reflection, on the one hand, on the quality of the 
     2 With the support of the papacy and the Italian state, Monsignor Giovanni Battista Scalabrini, Bishop of 
Piacenza, worked vigorously to create congregations of priests and nuns to meet the needs of overseas Italian 
communities. Today in the Philippines, the Congregation of Scalabrinians remains active both in fostering 
research on migration and as an advocacy group for Filipino emigrants. 
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Philippines’ human capital, education system and social norms, and, on the other hand, an 
admission of the fundamental weaknesses of a society that cannot find useful employment 
for its own people. 
   The Philippines shares many of the characteristics, both historically and in the contemporary 
world, of a less developed country providing development assistance to more developed 
countries through the provision of labour. Two features are however unique in the Filipino 
case: the size and socioeconomic diversity of the emigrant population and the role of both 
Filipino governments and civil society groups in grounding – and legitimizing – the place 
of the Filipino diaspora in cultural terms. Through the discourses and narratives surrounding 
the “new national heroes”, a reflection of a weakness in Filipino national development is 
reformulated as an expression of Filipino strength.
   It is precisely a sense of weakness that is at the heart of many characterizations of the 
Filipino state in the weak state/strong society dichotomy proposed by Joel Migdal (1988), 
which is a continuing theme of the most recent historical overview to address the subject of 
state-society relations (Abinales & Amoroso 2005). Certainly, if we take as a basis a Weberian 
definition of a state as possessing a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence or force and 
an ability to ensure sovereignty within its territory, then the Philippines indeed possesses a 
weak state. Not only do a long-running insurrection in Mindanao and a continuing insurgency 
in central Luzon threaten the territorial integrity of the Filipino nation, but the Filipino state 
is incapable of ensuring its own policing functions. 
   From observing the illegitimate activities of private paramilitary forces outside state 
control, to the sanctioned role of the ubiquitous private security companies who maintain 
security in Manila’s fortified suburbs, the Filipino state indeed seems weak. However, if our 
gaze is moved to other sectors of state responsibility, for example the ability to co-opt the 
resources of its overseas populations, then the picture becomes more blurred. For example, 
within Southeast Asia, the brutal and kleptocratic military dictatorship in Burma-Myanmar 
is at the head of a powerful garrison state with the capacity to wield overwhelming force. 
However, unlike the Filipino state, it has virtually no traction with its expatriate communities 
and is virtually incapable of capturing any part of their remittances, the vast bulk of which 
goes through informal channels beyond government control (Hugo 2005a). Which state is 
therefore the weakest? Remittances, as will be argued later, are a central element in a Filipino 
state developmentalist (or, perhaps, non-developmentalist) strategy. We need therefore to 
conceptualize in more nuanced terms our thinking on the state and adapt it to non-Western 
situations (Nettl 1968; Geertz 2004). 
   In order to liberate ourselves both of the Weberian possibilities and the ensuing Marxian 
constraints of a “rational” view of statehood, a parallel and contrasting perspective comes 
from Southeast Asia and its observers, in quoting the most influential cultural anthropologist 
of the last three decades, Clifford Geertz, in his analysis of the “theatre politics” of Bali 
in the nineteenth century: “That master noun of modern political discourse, state, has at 
least three etymological themes diversely condensed within it: status in the sense of station, 
standing rank, condition – estate (“The glories of our blood and state”); pomp, in the sense 
of splendour, display, dignity, presence – stateliness (“In pomp ride forth; for pomp becomes
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the great/And Majesty derives a grace from state”); and governance” in the sense of regnancy, 
regime, dominion, mastery – statecraft (“It may pass for a maxim in state that the administration 
cannot be placed in too few hands, nor the legislature in too many).” (Geertz 1980: 121)
   In terms of an examination of emigration and relations with its diaspora, inversing his 
order, it could be argued that the state acts in three fields: statecraft, i.e. what the state “does” 
at the local level, as in imposing rules and norms; stateliness, i.e. its actions in relation 
to other states, including the negotiating of diplomatic agreements, bargains and other 
compromises; and estate (status), which is what permeates the following, suggesting that 
the Filipino state is strong in imposing itself as the central interlocutor in relation to overseas 
Filipino communities.
   In a comparative study of states and industrial transformation, Peter Evans (1995) suggests 
that, as well as going beyond a weak state/strong state dichotomy, we also need to call 
into question the predatory/developmentalist juxtaposition. For example, the Filipino state’s 
control of emigration and its partial cooptation of its expatriate population is indeed both 
predatory (in skimming off rents) and also developmentalist (in encouraging reinvestment 
in the “homeland”). Evans further suggests that we should concentrate on examining state 
roles in relation to particular sectors. He also posits embeddedness within the context of 
an evolving political space shared with civil society actors. His views are summarized in 
table 13. 
   As suggested, this typology is an attempt to go beyond the classical dichotomy between 
regulatory and producer states, for this distinction is meaningless in the case of emigration 
and the cooptation of expatriate communities. Certainly the custodian role of the Filipino 
state – through both its role in licensing recruitment agencies for overseas workers and its 
regulations in areas such as dual citizenship, overseas voting or banking – is pre-eminent. 
Nevertheless, if one in a lapse of good taste considers OFWs as an “export product”, then 
the Filipino state has also been involved in the productive function, at the very least in 
the provision of publicly financed education for prospective emigrants, thus performing in 
Evans’s terms a demiurge function. Furthermore, in responding to changes in the global labour 
market, for example a massive dearth of nurses in the developed world, the Filipino state 
has encouraged, or at least accompanied, private sector actors to meet this demand. Finally, 
in the creation of a series of public bodies to oversee its labour export strategy, the Filipino 
state has diminished the risks for the private sector. Above all the Filipino state has been 
central in both the naming and promotion of a so-called Filipino diaspora as an instrument 
of national development. It is this naming process, and its context, that is examined in the 
following section.
     3 Refer to the appendices for the tables.
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ThE PoLiTiCAL ECoNomy oF ThE FiLiPiNo DiASPoRA’S CREATioN4
   It is very difficult to disagree with Stéphane Dufoix (2003) who sees the word “diaspora” 
becoming a “mot passe-partout“, a catch-all term5 used today in the media to describe 
overseas communities emanating from a particular national origin. Originally restricted to 
peoples dispersed because of persecution (the Jewish and Armenian diasporas, for example), 
the term took on a much wider use with the success in the mid-1990s of a business book, 
Tribes, by Joel Kotkin (1994), which traced the links between race, religion, identity and 
success in business. Yet applying the epithet to the Filipino case is not at all commonly 
accepted. Neither in the original 1997 edition nor in the more recent second edition (2008) of 
his seminal study on global diasporas does Robin Cohen mention a Filipino diaspora. Other 
comparative studies, such as the edited volume by Gabriel Sheffer (1986) or his 2003 study 
of diaspora politics, never, or barely, mention the existence of a possible Filipino diaspora. 
Two major readers published respectively in 1999 (Vertovec & Cohen) and in 2003 (Evans 
Braziel & Mannur), compiling articles written in recent decades, do not deem the Philippines 
worthy of a mention. As for the comparative literature in French, not only do Gérard Chaliand 
and Jean-Pierre Rageau (1991) consider the Philippines unworthy of a map in their atlas, but 
both Stéphane Dufoix (2003) and Michel Bruneau (2004) dismiss the existence of a Filipino 
diaspora. Bruneau, for example, prefers to categorize overseas Filipinos as a “transnational 
community”, for these communities “do not possess the historical depth of diasporas” and, 
significantly, because they are “linked to a (sending) state which attempts to use its emigrants 
in order to become a transnational state” (Bruneau 2004: 191). We have to wait till the 
publication in 2004 of the first Encyclopedia of Diasporas to see a Philippine diaspora drawn 
into a pantheon of diasporic communities (Lawless 2004). Lest it appear that the reason for 
this neglect is some kind of Orientalist disdain for the peoples of an Asian country, both 
China and India are deemed worthy of a prodigious amount of literature on their respective 
diasporas. Moreover, when one turns to Europe, while 10% of British citizens live overseas 
(The Economist 5/1/2008), a proportion similar to that of Filipinos living overseas, both 
scientific and media discussion of a British diaspora is virtually non-existent.6 
     4 The present author, who has dual citizenship, discovered in the course of his research that, much to his 
surprise, he is a putative member of a diaspora. The most eminent geographer in Australia has declared the 
existence of an “Australian diaspora” (Hugo 2005). Two points can be drawn from this anecdote. Firstly, the 
role of the external observer in constructing membership within new emotionally charged categories. Secondly, 
his categorization fits rather well into attempts by recent Australian governments to channel overseas Australian 
elites as vectors for promoting national development. 
     5 My translation as “catch-all term” rather than another possible translation is deliberate. In particular, I wish 
to invoke the notion of “mobilizing” and co-opting that is found in political science literature, say in the term 
“catch-all political party”.
     6 The exception is the study of Constantine (2003).
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   How then can we explain the entry, so to speak, of a Filipino diaspora into both comparative 
studies of migration and, more particularly, into daily language? Two complimentary 
explanations are possible. First of all, the cumulative impact of a substantial literature written 
by both Filipino and Filipino-American social scientists on Filipinos overseas – in which the 
term “diaspora” has been common currency for at least a decade – has been at last to break 
down the resistance to a broadened conceptualization of the notion so as to embrace the 
Filipino case. Nevertheless, another explanation can be posited, namely an overpowering 
fascination with the question of remittances that impacted on the international community 
in the first half of the decade (Kutznetsov 2006). As the mainstream media reported in 
the following year, the remittances of overseas workers globally had overtaken Overseas 
Development Assistance as a source of wealth and, potentially at least, of development 
assistance for developing countries. As a result, interest in overseas workers generally, and 
Filipino overseas workers as an exemplary case in particular, as vectors for development 
in the developing world, intensified with studies by the World Bank (World Bank 2005; 
Maimbo & Ratha 2005) as well as by its affiliates both the Asian Development Bank (2004) 
and the Inter-American Development Bank (Terry & Wilson 2005). Other international 
financial bodies, such as the International Monetary Fund (Burgess & Vikram 2005) and 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2005), jumped, so 
to speak, on the bandwagon in making remittances the new development mantra of the 
new century (Kapur 2005). Moreover, the remittance issue provided an opportunity for 
institutions such as the International Organization for Migration (Ghosh 2006, Ionescu 2006) 
and other UN development-oriented agencies, as well as international advocacy groups in 
favour of immigrant rights, to find common cause with the guardians of the international 
financial system. As a result of the research by these varied international actors, emerged a 
new normative agenda that argued that, as overseas workers contributed significantly to the 
development of their home countries, their migration should be facilitated and their rights 
protected.
   In such a normative climate, it could be argued that if a Filipino diaspora did not exist 
it would have needed to be invented. As tables 2-4 suggest, the Philippines ranks in the 
top league of remittance receiving countries. While in terms of absolute amounts (table 2) 
it ranked in 2007 fourth behind India, China and Mexico, these countries benefit, in the 
first two cases from a labour pool that is twelve to twenty times higher, or, in the case of 
Mexico, from extremely close proximity to a labour-receiving country whose dual labour 
market depends on reliable sources of low-cost workers. However, when the percentage 
contribution to GDP is considered, the 13% of the Philippines dwarves the maximum of 
2.9% in the other three countries (table 3). Moreover, in a quarter century, the proportion of 
contribution to GDP has gone from 2.3% in 1981 to 13% in 2007. 
   Remittances, both by regular and informal channels of Filipinos living overseas, contributed 
some $17 billion to the Filipino economy in 2007, a sum that, as previously mentioned, 
came to almost 13% of Filipino GDP and half of the total foreign reserves of the country.7 
Their contribution to the GDP of their home country is exceeded only by the contributions 
     7 Financial Times, 17/10/06, The Economist 25/11/06. 
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of populations from small countries, such as Lebanon (25.2%). Within Asia, Bangladesh, 
the only country of similar demographic size, is well behind, with a contribution to 
GDP of 8.8%. The 13% figure would seem to include remittances sent through informal 
channels, remittances which, almost by definition, remain difficult to quantify, and explain 
the 3% difference in contribution to GDP in relation to the 10% calculated in table 4 by 
the Philippines Central Bank. These transfers enabled the Philippines to be relatively little 
effected by the 1997-98 Asian Economic Crisis.8 Indeed in 1998, at the height of the crisis, 
overseas remittances enabled the Philippines to experience a negative growth rate of only 
0.6%, compared with an estimated negative rate of 1.1% without remittances (IBON 2008: 
13). Since then, Filipino growth rates have been respectable, although the 2005 rate of 
5.1% was significantly lower than that of Vietnam (8.4%) or of China (9.9%).9 Be that as it 
may, the newly discovered Filipino diaspora had been elevated to the role of a pre-eminent 
economic actor within the Philippines. Thus, rather than being an indication of the failure of 
development policies within the Philippines, the fact that people had now become the major 
Filipino export indicated that the Philippines had not only fully taken on its role within an 
international division of labour, but had, more importantly, turned its expatriate population 
into a vector of its own economic growth. 
   While the debate on diaspora within the social sciences has moved on – notably with 
the contribution of anthropologists (e.g. Ong 1999) who see diaspora as constructed and as 
a strategic process – this does not obviate the usefulness of examining particular overseas 
communities in the light of a number of generally accepted criteria. In his previously 
mentioned introduction to global diasporas, Robin Cohen proposes a larger number of ideal 
types of diaspora than the more commonly accepted definitions related to victimhood (the 
Jewish and Armenian communities) or commerce (the Chinese and, to some extent, Indian). 
He has summarized these ideal types in table 5. 
   Thoroughly examining overseas Filipino communities using Cohen’s typologies as a 
template would require a series of book-length, historically grounded and sociologically 
sensitive studies. Nevertheless a cursory examination would suggest that overseas Filipino 
communities share attributes of all five ideal types. Clearly the labour element is pre-eminent 
in the overseas Filipino experience, with the Filipino case corresponding to John Armstrong’s 
(1976) definition of a proletarian diaspora. Yet other elements come into play. At least in 
some of the narratives of the overseas Filipino communities, a strong sense of victimhood, 
particularly in regard to racism, is apparent (Aguilar 2005; Baldoz 2004; Lindio-McGovern 
2004). Such a sense of the Pinoy (overseas Filipino) as victim is also fed by a particularly 
vibrant and historically profound (and at times morbid) Catholic tradition (Rafael 1993), 
one that places a particular eschatological emphasis on martyrdom. Indeed as Reynaldo 
Ileto (1979) demonstrated in one of the classics of Filipino historiography, social struggles 
     8 This author remembers vividly the frenzy of activity in cavernous Filipino shopping malls in the Christmas 
period of 1997. With the devaluation of the peso from 25 to 40 to the US dollar, those benefiting from overseas 
remittances suddenly found themselves a third wealthier.
     9 Statistics from the Annual Report of the Asian Development Bank (www.adb.org).
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within the Philippines during the nineteenth century were interpreted through the lens of the 
Passion of Christ. Lest this interpretation appear far-fetched, the passions aroused throughout 
the Philippines by the hanging of Flor Contemplacion, a Filipino maid executed in Singapore 
in 1995, were ignited by a sense of both her martyrdom (by an unmerciful, albeit fraternal 
Southeast Asian government) and her depiction as a victim of the poverty that drives some 
Filipinos from home. It could be suggested that the sense of victimhood is also exacerbated 
through the experience of servitude, either as maids or even as caregivers, that a gender-
determined part of the diasporic population feels.
   Both the possibilities of emigration and a certain predisposition to emigrate are intelligible 
only when membership – unwilling though at times it may have been – of an imperial 
order is taken into account. During the three and a half centuries of Spanish colonial rule, 
seafarers from what is today the Philippines were employed in small numbers on Spanish 
vessels. Yet it was the annexation of the Philippines into an American Empire in 1898 that 
marked the real beginnings of Filipino emigration, with Filipino workers sent to work on 
plantations in both Hawaii and California. As Filomeno Aquilar (2000) has suggested, the 
“long-distance nationalism”10 demonstrated by some Filipinos overseas today remains tinged 
with a great deal of ambivalence towards the former (and present?) imperial power. At the 
very least, like their British counterparts of another age, Filipinos overseas have performed 
a role in the imperial mission (both past and present). After an initial five-year phase of 
violent subjugation to destroy the first Asian republic, the American imperial presence in the 
Philippines was essentially one based on persuasion in order to recreate, so to speak, Filipinos 
as Americans through their acceptance of American political, social and economic norms. 
Particularly in the establishment of an education system based on the US model, American 
colonial policy can be seen as an exercise in imperial social engineering (May 1980). In 
the contemporary Philippines, the renewed emphasis placed on English language learning 
to prepare for emigration remains in continuity with that past (Simon 2008). Nor, given the 
pre-eminence of the Filipino-American as the archetypical member of the Filipino diaspora, 
is it an exaggeration to see an imperial strand permeating such conceptualizations.
   Within Cohen’s ideal types, the distinction between “trade” and “labour” is perhaps more 
difficult to justify. Amongst the trade diaspora par excellence, the ancestors of many an 
overseas Chinese businessperson were indentured labourers fleeing the poverty and internal 
warfare in late nineteenth century China. In the contemporary world, where much of the 
international economy relies on the trade of services, the distinction perhaps has even 
less salience. Some expatriate Filipinos would consciously describe themselves as traders 
of sorts within the global economy. Finally, as far as the ideal type of deterritorialization 
is concerned then, on one level, given the existence of a territorially-bounded sovereign 
homeland, this category is not applicable. However, as will be argued later, given the reified 
     10 In the final section of the paper Filipino forms long-distance nationalism will be examined. Building on 
an idea of Benedict Anderson (1998), Schiller (2004) and Schiller & Fouron define long-distance nationalists 
as asserting that “people living in various disparate geographic locations within different nation states share a 
common identification with an ancestral territory and government. Hence, long-distance nationalism provides 
a justification for such a government to re-configure itself as a transnational state.” (Schiller & Fouron 2001:20). 
See also Schiller 2004. 
Les Etudes du CERI - n° 152 - décembre 2008 12
sense of a Filipino nation amongst some Filipinos overseas, it does not remain a “place” to 
which a physical return is either possible or sought after. In short, one can posit a degree of 
deterritorialization in a sense of “national” identification, which is, however, accommodated 
and reterritorialized in the forms of binary nationalism suggested below. 
ThE FiLiPiNo DiASPoRA: AN iNTERRogATivE SkETCh
   Once a wide definition of diaspora is accepted, as has been proposed in the preceding 
discussion, it is reasonable to conclude that a Filipino diaspora exists. The obvious ensuing 
question is, who are its members? The Filipino diaspora is, above all characterized by its 
incredible occupational diversity, going from maids to senior executives, labourers to nurses, 
and entertainers to academics. The appendix provides a statistical breakdown of the over 
8 million Filipinos of the Filipino diaspora, one that can be divided into permanent emigrants 
(43%) and temporary and irregular emigrants (57%). As the table indicates, the vast majority of 
permanent emigrants (82%) are in the United States and Canada, with smaller groups of a 
similar size (6.7%) in various European countries and in Australia and New Zealand. Given 
existing citizenship laws in those countries, it is reasonable to assume that a significant 
proportion of these people have taken up the citizenship of their receiving countries. 
   The 1.8 million Filipinos living in the Middle East, including more than 1 million in Saudi 
Arabia alone, are almost entirely temporary residents on fixed work contracts with almost 
zero possibility of attaining the nationality of their receiving countries. Much of the hype 
surrounding the existence of a Filipino diaspora and, above all, a Filipino transnationalism, 
totally neglects the lived experience of these sojourners. For example, a former construction 
site foreman just returned from Saudi Arabia described his twenty years there as “mental 
torture” in an interview, going on to say how proud he was that his remittances had meant 
that his two sons were now trained professionals who would never have to leave the 
Philippines to find satisfying jobs.11 While Filipinos in the US, irrespective of socioeconomic 
status, and Filipino nurses and domestic workers, particularly in Asia, have been the subject 
of a great deal of research, Filipino manual workers in the Middle East are today virtually 
absent from most narratives of the Filipino experience overseas. While this population was 
an object of study some two decades ago (Arcinas et al 1989; Go & Postrado 1986), for the 
most part today it no longer figures in the social science literature.12 Put prosaically, the 
     11 Interview with the author, Pasig City, 26 February 2008.
     12 The exception is the research of Jane Margold (1995, republished in Aguilar 2002). One can only assume 
that the dearth of studies on Filipino workers in the Middle East is a result of authoritarian regimes in those 
countries restricting access to researchers. Once again, here is an example of state intervention in determining 
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world-view, self-identity and loyalties of a contract worker in Riyadh are, to say the least, 
rather different from a dual-national Filipino academic in California. However the “catch-all” 
category of diaspora obscures such differences. It could be argued that the contract worker 
in Saudi Arabia “will always be a Filipino”, with virtually no possibility of integration in 
the Saudi polity because of the parameters on his existence determined by two states: the 
Saudi and the Filipino. As the result of a similar dual statist intervention, namely that of the 
American authorities and that of the Philippine state, the dual citizenship Filipino academic 
in California has before him/her a wide political space in which he/she is able to maintain 
not only dual identities, but also dual loyalties. 
   And how are we to situate the literally “landless” 275,000 sea-based workers, an 
extraordinary one-quarter to one-third of all sea-based workers internationally? As Steven 
McKay (2007) argues, their experience reinforces a sense of a particular Filipino masculinity 
accentuated by their presence in a hierarchical, largely ethnically defined, labour niche in 
which they find themselves generally at the bottom of the ladder. Significantly, the massive 
growth in the number of Filipino seafarers from virtually none in the late 1960s to the one-
third of the total mentioned above is in large part a result of the promotion, and the control, 
of the Filipino state. Yet, if one of the characteristics of a diaspora is to be nomadic, then 
Filipino seafarers could be seen to meet this criterion. However, if another characteristic is 
to have a “here” (a host country) in reference to a “there” (a lost home), then situating sea-
based workers as part of a diaspora is much more problematical. Sea-based workers, as the 
ultimate sojourners, are not localised other than in the Philippines, a context that seems to 
be reflected in the seeming need to be in constant contact, either by mobile telephone or by 
the internet, with their families back home. A sense of deprivation and separation from home 
is particularly acute in this part of the Filipino population (Fernandez & Krootjes 2007). 
Moreover, it is important to note that while sea-based workers make up only 3.3% of the total 
Filipinos overseas, they provide 15.3% of total remittances (cf. table 9 in the appendices). 
Various complementary explanations can be given for this, ranging from the ability of sea-
based workers, most of whom have had at least four years of study, to command higher 
salaries, and therefore greater disposable incomes than some other occupational groups, to 
a stronger emotional commitment to home and family. However, an important element is in 
the contract provisions for sea-based workers imposed by the Filipino authorities that freeze 
a percentage of salaries for remittances. 
   A catch-all diasporic classification also distracts from the gender-occupation nexus amongst 
Filipino overseas workers (Tyner 2004). The Filipino state has been quick to react to overseas 
employment possibilities (Oishi 2005, Yamanaka & Piper 2005), and has progressively 
brought about a gender reorientation, notably through the increase in the supply of domestic 
helpers and care-givers. Today it is estimated that two thirds of OFWs are women (Asis 
2005). Filipina domestic workers are ubiquitous in Hong Kong (Constable 2007), Singapore 
(Huang & Yeoh 1996) and Taiwan (Lan 2006). Their presence in Western Europe has been 
the subject of an edited volume dealing with individual countries (Hogsholm 2007), as 
well as individual studies of France and Italy and, across the Atlantic, in Canada (McKay 
the parameters of the diasporic experience by limiting the possibility of its narration. 
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2005). Yet, once again, the thousands of domestic workers in the Middle East remain largely 
invisible in the social science literature, whereas in the popular press, periodic cases of 
abuse bring their situation to the attention of a Filipino public. The obfuscating behaviour 
of authoritarian regimes – requiring at the least a quiet, and complicit, acquiescence of the 
Filipino and other governments – largely ensures that their narratives of lived experience do 
not enter into the larger narrative of the Filipino diaspora.
   Yet, despite this caveat, as the prodigious amount of research of Rhacel Salazar Parrenas 
(2006; 2008) in particular indicates, the entry of Filipina overseas workers into a niche 
market at the global level impacts into the smallest villages of parts of the Philippines. In 
2007, the academic journal Philippine Studies published a special issue on Filipinas as 
“global householders” (Porrio 2007) that explored some of these consequences. Nevertheless 
with a couple of exceptions (Arboleda & Nuqui 2007; Asis et al 2004), Filipina domestic 
workers and their families are more described and their lives interpreted by outsiders, than 
do they articulate their experience themselves. In this preliminary, and deliberately macro, 
extended essay on Filipino emigration, it has not been an objective to enter into the social 
consequences “back home” of the reliance on remittances, itself requiring family separation. 
As the international press has reported, the consequence is mono-parental families or 
families in which children are brought up by grandparents or other family members (Time 
24/11/2008). Much is made also of the villages where the men no longer work, relying on 
the remittances of their wives working as maids or in the “entertainment industry” (Pertierra 
1992). Yet the question remains as to what extent these domestic workers are part of a global 
nation (Kelly 2008). Once again, under the impulsion of the Filipino state and in response 
to an early twenty-first century obsession with popular capitalism, overseas domestic workers 
have seen their role within the diaspora evolve from being merely expatriate breadwinners 
to potential investors within a struggling Filipino economy (Weekley 2006).
   Of the total number of Filipinos overseas, just over 10% are categorized as irregular 
migrants (Battistella & Asis 2003). Without the state sanctioning provided both by their home 
country and their place of sojourn and settlement, where do these individuals fit within the 
Filipino diaspora? Moreover between 5% and 10% of the population of irregular migrants, 
i.e. between 40,000 and 80,000 individuals, are, according to Filipino NGOs, victims of 
people trafficking, 80% of them being women forced into commercial sex.13 To state what 
may appear obvious, the negotiation of an existence as a member of the Filipino diaspora 
is fraught with significant difficulties for a population without even basic legal forms of 
protection, despite the terms of the 1987 Filipino Constitution (Emerton & Peterson 2006). 
In Europe, undocumented Filipino maids are not only in a fragile situation in relation to their 
employers and the authorities, their possible links with home are also constrained, for any 
potential visit to family in the Philippines is accompanied by the risk of not being able to re-
enter their new place of residence. Much of the hype concerning new instantaneous forms 
of communication (mobile telephones, the internet) completely misses the point that the 
“longing for home” would seem to require being fed with real human contact.
      13 Interview with Attorney Golda Myra of the Commission on Filipinos Overseas, 24 January 2008.
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   We will now move on to the Filipino expatriate who has become almost the symbol of the 
overseas Filipino, namely nurses. Since the mid-1990s the number of Filipino nurses going 
overseas has risen exponentially (Kingma 2006) as a result of massively increasing demand 
in countries having to cope with ageing populations, and in which the low salaries and poor 
working conditions offered to locally educated nurses make working in this profession an 
unattractive proposition. After the largely gendered market niche of sea-based workers, the 
Filipino state again has found a new labour market opportunity in the nursing profession. 
That being said, the expatriation of Filipino nurses is not a new phenomenon, for as Choy 
(2003) has shown, Filipinos have taken up nursing roles in the United States since the early 
part of the American chapter in the short-lived, but seminal, period of American colonization. 
A Filipino who passes the US Registered Nurses examination is virtually assured of an entry 
permit not only to the United States but also, with greater difficulty, to the UK or Germany. 
In these countries his/her salary will be five to ten times greater than that in the Philippines.14 
Within the Philippines, the education system has adapted to this demand from the global 
health market with a proliferation of nursing schools to produce for the export market. Newly 
graduated nurses, this author was told, in certain cases do not receive salaries in their first 
years in Filipino hospitals and clinics, for employers know they require this experience in 
order to sit for the registration examinations that make them employable overseas.
   As a perusal of the bibliography at the end of this essay would indicate, the most widely 
studied group within the Filipino diaspora is that living within the United States (Bonus 2000; 
Espiritu 1992, 2003; Gonzalez 2002; Ignacio 2005; Mendoza 2002; Okamura 1998; Root 
1997; San Juan 1998). A summary of this copious literature is beyond the bounds of this present 
piece of work. Nevertheless, it should be noted that it is largely from observation of the US 
experience that theories concerning transnationalism developed. Yet does the experience of 
Filipino-Americans in itself provide evidence for such transnationalism? At the outset, it must 
be acknowledged that the term “Filipino-Americans” covers a community whose members 
may enjoy one of at least three types of legal status: temporary or permanent residents in 
the US who maintain only their Filipino citizenship, dual citizens of the Philippines and the 
United States, or people born only as US citizens or have opted for US citizenship. Without 
labouring the point, it is the social and political space determined by both the American and 
Filipino state that enables these three possibilities.15
   Ostensibly diasporic behaviour amongst Filipino-Americans can be diversely interpreted, 
as the following example suggests. For the children of Filipino immigrants in the United 
States, living in binary worlds requires forms of often emotionally charged negotiations 
(Wolf 2002). Many thousands of students of Filipino origin enrol both in Tagalog language 
classes (despite the fact that Tagalog may not have been the language of their parents or 
     14 In 2007 it was widely reported that the top graduate of the University of Philippines medical school had 
renounced practising as a doctor and had enrolled in a nursing school in order to obtain his RN certificate and 
practise overseas.
      15 A similar argument could be made for “Filipino-Canadians” (Silva 2006), even if, significantly, such a 
categorisation does not seem to exist.
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grandparents) and in courses in Philippine Studies. At one level, this can be interpreted 
as the “search for roots” common amongst many second- or third-generation immigrants 
irrespective of their ethnic origins or host country. On another level, from the perspective 
of transnational theorists, this provides tangible evidence of transnational identities. 
However, relying on the earlier research of Yen Le Espiritu (1992), a third interpretation 
is also convincing, namely the search for a specific identity within a larger, constructed 
community of Asian-Americans or American ethnics (Aguilar 2004 quoting Vicente Rafael) 
in relation to a dominant “European-American” society.16 Such an interpretation would seem 
better to approximate Filipinos’ senses of self-identity in the US. While within a group of 
other Filipinos, people of Filipino origins tend to define themselves in local terms (from 
Manila, Luzon, Illocos, Visayas, etc.), within a diverse Asian-American context, the Filipino 
specificity is emphasized. Finally, as Espiritu demonstrates, there are considerable social 
pressures militating towards the construction of a “pan-ethnic” Asian-American community. 
Such a self-definition is particularly attractive for Filipino-Americans, for Asian-Americans 
are popularly perceived as being endowed with a number of ostensibly Confucian values: 
thrift, hard work, a desire for education, family loyalty, etc. It is paradoxical that while a 
sort of internationalist pan-Asianism as ideology was discredited during the Second World 
War – and ultimately collapsed (after a brief moment of respite at Bandung in 1955) during 
the Cold War – it has been resurrected domestically as a sub-national, normatively loaded, 
identifier in the United States and other Western countries.
   The emigration of Filipinos to the United States or other countries is certainly transnational 
in the sense that boundaries are crossed and resettlement occurs in another nation state. 
But just as dwelling in a nation does not necessary make an individual an adherent to the 
nationalism17 of that nation, so is it not at all obvious that being a transnational migrant makes 
an individual a transnationalist. This author concurs both with the theoretical objections to 
the concept expressed by Roger Waldinger and David Fitzgerald (2004) that much of the 
present preoccupation with “transnationalism” involves merely the relabelling of some, if not 
at all, contemporary forms of multiple identities amongst migrant groups. Underlying this 
retreat into new labels is a certain lack of comparative historical understanding of migratory 
phenomena. In the case of the US, Ewa Morawska (2001) sees the “new transnationalist” 
theorists basing their interpretations on incorrect historical assumptions about the previous 
great wave of immigration dating from the 1880s to 1914. As has been suggested earlier, 
a failure to contemplate the role say of the Italian, Portuguese or even British states in 
emigration neglects fundamental parameters in which overseas communities exist and 
relate to their homelands. Perhaps anthropologists and sociologists would have a different 
     16 Observing the 2008 US presidential election campaign with its discursive references to a “true” and 
“false” America and its McCarthyist references to “un-American” behaviour, it seems striking that the only part 
of the population deemed not to require a hyphenated eponym were the majority of distant and varied English 
origins. 
     17 Anthony Smith’s standard definition of nationalism is “an ideological movement for the attainment and 
maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members to 
constitute an actual or potential nation” (Smith 2000: 1).
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perception, but it is difficult to disagree with the Filipino historian Filomeno Aguilar – who 
feels that for transnationalism to exist there must also exist a transnation – when he states: 
“It is doubtful if the transnation exists or if its discursive existence can be made to jibe with 
social practices and realities, or if there is even coherence in the ambivalent and discordant 
voices of transnationalism.” (Aguilar 2004: 114)
   If, therefore, we are not witnessing in the Filipino case forms of transnationalism, are 
there at least indications of what Riva Kastoryano (2007) has described as “transnational 
nationalism”, i.e. forms of nationalism articulated from overseas? The evidence from 
the case of Filipino-Americans does not support such an interpretation either. Rather we 
have evidence of what could be termed “bi or dual nationalism” (i.e. twofold nationalist 
sentiments) or even more potently what this author would describe as a “binary nationalism” 
involving both juxtaposition and synthesis between identification with a Filipino homeland 
and an American homeland. Research carried out on the ultimate transnational media, the 
worldwide web, would seem to support this interpretation. Emily Ignacio’s (2005) analysis 
of Filipino community formation through an examination of Filipino-American newsgroups 
debates, listservers and website postings reveals a predominant dialectic in imagining a 
Filipino diaspora: Filipinos are being defined constantly in relation to Americans and the 
Philippines in relation to the US. Other studies (Martinez 2007; Tyner & Kuhike 2000) would 
seem to support this view. The appropriate means to escape from these binary constraints is 
entry into a kind of globalized epistemic community, which is sometimes, inappropriately, 
labelled as a kind of deterritorialized diaspora, but which it may be more appropriate to 
define as merely another form of cosmopolitanism, albeit of a rooted type (Appiah 2005). 
Be that as it may, diasporic communities rarely escape the state-orchestrated parameters that 
both limit and mobilize their energies, as will, hopefully, be demonstrated in the following 
section.
STATE-oRChESTRATED EmigRATioN FRom ThE PhiLiPPiNES
   Unlike social science observers, actors within the Filipino state lose little sleep over 
the status of their expatriate populations. What is primordial is to appeal to a sense of 
Filipino nationalism as a mobilizing factor for emigration, expatriation, work, sacrifice 
and… reinvestment. By, in a sense, integrating into its action the long-distance or binary 
nationalisms referred to above, the Filipino state can legitimize its control over this overseas 
population and extra-territorialize the sway of its sovereignty. 
   As mentioned, the American colonial state within the Philippines sought to channel 
Filipino workers overseas into serving its interests through their participation in a racially 
segregated labour market within the United States (Aguilar 2000; Baldoz 2004). However, 
with restrictive immigration policies introduced in the US from the 1920s till after the Second 
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World War, Filipino emigration declined. In the first couple of decades after independence 
in 1946, there was a sense that internal change and economic development could solve 
the problems of political contestation, poverty and a rapidly growing labour force. When 
this failed as a way of removing peasant support for insurrectionist movements, internal 
transmigration within the Philippines to the sparsely populated areas of Mindanao remained 
an alternative. With the election of Ferdinand Marcos as president in 1965 and his declaration 
of martial law on 23 September 1972, the situation changed. In 1974, ostensibly to cope 
with the consequences of the first oil crisis, Marcos proposed that the Philippines encourage 
emigration of workers as a “temporary measure”. Over three decades later, the temporary has 
become a permanent feature of the Filipino political economy. The period from about 1973 
till the fall of Marcos marks the first of three periods in state intervention in contemporary 
Filipino emigration and, concomitantly, its relations with overseas Filipino communities.
   The Marcos phase in emigration has a number of specific features. In order to ensure his 
continued rule, Marcos instituted a particular model of kleptocratic economic management 
involving both repressive measures through the military, but also the cultivation of a coterie 
of cronies with whom a Faustian bargain of mutual dependency had been sealed. Patronage-
client relations were refined to percolate down to all levels of society and the Philippines 
gave to popular parlance the expression “crony capitalism”. At the time of his fall in 1986, 
it was estimated that Marcos alone had siphoned some $10 billion into overseas bank 
accounts. Unlike, however, the comparable dictatorial situation in Korea, corruption did 
not facilitate economic development in the Philippines, but thwarted it (Kang 2002). Having 
nationalized the assets of his political enemies, in the words of David Kang: “Marcos created 
new oligarchs who were dependent solely on him for their success, and he also rewarded 
traditional elites who cooperated with him… Thus the direction of corruption shifted from 
the bottom-up plundering of the state to the top-down plundering of society.” (Kang 2002: 
138)
   With the benefit of hindsight, emigration had a particular role to play. On one level, it 
performed the human capital element of an export-oriented development strategy, a strategy 
that, unlike in the Asian tiger economies, did not succeed (Hawes 1987). Emigration for 
Marcos, and indeed for his successors, offered a social safety valve to relieve the twin, 
underlying problems of Filipino society. On the one hand, to cope with chronic inequalities, 
with an effective programme of land reform in order to empower the landless peasantry, and, 
on the other hand, through a vigorous family planning programme to address the Philippines’ 
demographic explosion that each year brings thousands of unemployable individuals into 
the labour force. These twin actions were the prerequisites for the economic take-off of other 
Asian countries, but, alas, not the Philippines (Camroux 2007). 
   While initially, the Filipino state sought to directly control recruitment for overseas 
employment through state agencies, the weakness of the state apparatus, and the need to 
provide sops to other crony interests, led to a degree of privatization (Abella 2004). From 
1974 till 1982, the emigration programme was supervised by three separate state agencies: 
the National Seamen Board, the Overseas Employment Development Board and the Bureau 
of Employment Services. In 1984, these three agencies were merged to form a mega agency, 
the Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), which today remains the main 
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government agency involved with Philippine labour emigration. Attached to the Ministry of 
Labour and Employment, POEA is composed of four divisions: pre-employment services, 
licensing and regulation, adjudication, and welfare and employment. The POEA’s mandate 
is to facilitate and promote overseas employment, provide for the reintegration of returning 
workers, and offer protection and welfare to workers and their families.18
   Overseas employment coupled, most importantly, with liberalized immigration laws in 
the United States engendered a significant outflow of Filipino professionals across the Pacific 
and was, in the end, to contribute to the end of the Marcos dictatorship. For those neither 
economically powerful nor politically well connected enough to join in the parasitic activity 
of Marcos and his cronies, emigration to the United States offered the only viable alternative. 
These expatriates coalesced as a force around Benigno Aquino, the main opponent of Marcos, 
who, after a number of years of imprisonment, was allowed to go to the US for medical 
treatment. Exiled in Boston, Aquino was able to mobilize the overseas Filipino communities 
in order to plan his return and to lobby for an end to US support for Marcos. On his return 
to Manila in 1983, Aquino was assassinated, contributing to a chain of developments, above 
all involving massive public protests that led to the election of his widow, Cory, as president 
in 1986 and the departure of Marcos under US pressure. With hindsight, the victory of Cory 
Aquino was to mark the high point of political activism amongst the Filipino diaspora. Long-
distance and binary nationalisms had shown their potency as forces for political change 
when given channels for expression and unique circumstances.
   Perhaps because she was a scion of one of the largest land-holding families in the 
Philippines, or perhaps because of her conservative Catholic beliefs, Aquino largely failed to 
implement serous land reform or even contemplate a family planning programme during her 
presidency. She did however acknowledge the importance of overseas Filipino workers as an 
economic and political force. It was Cory Aquino who in 1988 coined the expression “New 
National Heroes” for OFWs. During her administration, the Welfare Fund Administration 
created under Marcos in 1980 was made a quasi-governmental, if independent, financial 
agency, the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA). OWWA is essentially 
a trust fund pooled from a mandatory US$25 membership contribution from foreign 
employers and land- and sea-based workers. These funds are reinvested and some of the 
interest obtained redistributed (Agunias & Ruiz 2007). The overthrow of the dictatorship 
saw the Filipino Congress finally become concerned with OFWs: between 1987 and 1991, 
23 Senate bills and 32 House of Representatives bills were filed in an attempt to investigate 
several mysterious OFW deaths.
   However, the second phase of Filipino state action in relation to its emigrant communities 
begins in 1995 following the previously mentioned hanging of Flor Contemplacion, a Filipina 
domestic worker in Singapore convicted of murder. Despite the pleas of the new Filipino 
President, Fidel Ramos, and despite severe misgivings on the fairness of her arrest, trial and 
conviction, the execution was carried out. The hanging sparked massive protests throughout 
the Philippines, protests that fundamentally challenged the Filipino state’s labour-export 
policy. Contemplacion’s case was not an exception: between 1996 and 2001, the bodies 
     18 The above relies on Gonzalez 1998 and Tyner 2004.
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of about 1,224 Filipinos were repatriated to the Philippines, all of whom were claimed 
to have died in unknown or mysterious circumstances. With democratization, the Filipino 
media began to report widely on the abuse of Filipinos overseas, particularly those trafficked 
unwillingly into prostitution. In 1995, Congress passed the Migrant Workers and Overseas 
Filipino Act (Republic Act 8042). Seen as a so-called Magna Carta of OFW Rights, the act 
signalled a new kind of relationship between the Philippine state and emigrant citizens to 
whom the state was required to offer protection (Rodriguez 2002). The passing of the act 
was followed by the creation of offices within Filipino embassies to cater for the protection 
and welfare of OFWs in the main labour-receiving countries. Since the passing of the act, 
the notion of citizenship rights has been extended to embrace these populations overseas, 
rights that are explicitly detailed in the Handbook for Filipinos Overseas published by the 
Commission on Filipinos Overseas (2005).
   A third and ongoing phase in state-diaspora relations began with the passing of the Overseas 
Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (Republic Act 9189), which, as the name suggests, is designed 
to encourage overseas Filipinos to participate in the political process (Rojas 2005). This 
act, coupled with the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act 
9225), which liberalized the possibilities for dual citizenship, expanded the area of rights 
for overseas Filipinos. While not directly linked, these legislative developments followed 
another display of massive popular protest, popularly know as People Power II, or Edsa 2. 
These protests saw President Joseph Estrada removed from office and his replacement by his 
vice-president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Supported by the Filipino middle classes and, as 
was the case in 1986, by the Military and the Church, Arroyo seemed initially to emulate 
Cory Aquino, casting herself as a champion of democracy. The difference however was 
that Estrada, a former movie actor, enjoyed a great deal of popular support amongst the 
poorest elements of society. Unlike Marcos, who was in the end universally reviled except 
in his own fiefdom, Estrada was portrayed as the friend of the poor, his corruption (and 
womanizing) being but minor blemishes. President Arroyo, with her US education and her 
PhD in economics, on the contrary, portrays herself as the face of a modern cosmopolitan 
Philippines integrated in a globalized world. Under her administration, emigration has gone 
from being portrayed as an unfortunate necessity (under Marcos), through being lauded as 
a sacrificial act (under Aquino and Ramos), to being portrayed as the much-vaunted Filipino 
contribution to the global economy.19 The rewards for this contribution, so to speak, are to 
found in incorporating the diaspora back within the nation.
   Yet, paradoxically, the tangible rewards are in practice minimal, or perhaps not appreciated. 
For example, in 2005, OWWA had a total investment portfolio of some US$134 million, 
mainly in government banks. Of its assets, US$17 million on average were spent per year 
between 2002 and 2006, over half of which went to administrative and operating costs, 
leaving a mere US$7.6 million for programmes to actually benefit OFWs. Despite the 
possibilities of registering for absentee voting, the results have been meagre. For the 2004 
     19 For example, at both the Asia-Europe Meeting in Beijing in late October 2008 and at the APEC Summit in 
Lima a month later, President Arroyo’s specific contribution was a rhetorical defence of migrant workers’ rights, 
a defence publicized on official government websites. 
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presidential elections, only approximately 360,000 had done so, of whom only half actually 
voted (Financial Times 8-9/5/2004). Few of the 1 million Filipinos in Saudi Arabia voted, 
although this may be due to the necessity to travel to Riyadh to the embassy to do so in person 
during the working week. In compact Hong Kong, on the contrary, 60% of registered voters 
actually did so. Of course, multiple factors could explain this low turnout: the complexity of 
enrolment, a lack of information, the unwillingness of those OFWs in an irregular situation 
not to become visible, etc. Nevertheless the degree of involvement in Filipino political life 
remains a moot point: in the last Philippine presidential elections, less than 10,000 Filipinos 
living in the United States actually voted. Above all, the voting situation raises questions as 
to the means, and limits, of state interventionism in mobilizing diasporic communities.
DEvELoPiNg AN ANALyTiCAL gRiD oF STATE-DiASPoRA RELATioNS iN ThE 
PhiLiPPiNES
   What conceptual and theoretical implications can therefore be drawn from the succinct 
overview of the three phases in Filipino administrations’ praxis with both emigration and 
its overseas population? In this final section, an attempt is made to draw some theoretical 
implications from the Filipino case. In doing so, we have synthesized a framework posited 
by Ingrid Therwath in a recent study of the Indian state and its diaspora. This framework is 
summarized in the third, and last, of the typologies designed to provide analytical templates 
within this study (table 6).
   As the previous discussion suggests, the role of the Filipino diaspora is above all that of 
an economic actor and as an outlet, particularly as a social safety valve. In the Filipino case, 
both these functions are interrelated. The central objective of state activity since 1974 has 
been resource husbandry, i.e. harnessing the financial resources of the Filipino diaspora in 
the form of remittances. Not only in absolute terms has the Filipino state been successful, but 
it has progressively diminished the proportion of remittances transmitted through informal 
channels, which has declined from about 20% to something like 5% (Asian Development 
Bank 2004). However, despite a greater efficacy of Filipino remittances compared to those 
of some other groups (Menjivar et al 1998), and despite numerous studies and proposals to 
harness these resources for investment in productive activities (Agunias 2006; Asis 2006; 
Estipular et al 2007; Ionescu 2006), this has not largely occurred (Bagasao 2005). Certainly, 
remittances have helped Filipinos ride out a number of economic shocks (Yang 2008), 
nevertheless a cursory examination would suggest that only a small proportion of these 
remittances is invested in productive activities, the vast bulk being spent on consumer goods 
or, at best, in keeping the Filipino housing market buoyant (ADB 2004). In certain cases, it has 
actually had a demotivating effect on employment (Capistrano & Sta Maria 2007). In other 
words, the reliance on remittances can be seen as both a sign of underdevelopment (Dumlao 
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2005; IBON 2008; Opiniano 2004; Pernia 2007; Pertierra 1992) and a failure of a purported 
Filipino development state (Herring 1999). At the very least, the reliance on remittances and 
their uses suggests confusion between the objectives of economic growth and of economic 
development. As tables 7-10 suggest, the benefits of remittances are unequally spread both 
in terms of region and in terms of adding to household wealth. To simplify, wealthier families 
closer to Manila benefit the most. 
   As for the other forms of co-optation on the political level, the results have indeed been 
mixed. Since the period of the opposition to Marcos, the general overall tendency has been 
to lesser, not greater, political engagement with the Philippines. The possibility of absentee 
voting and more liberalized conditions for dual nationality have not been translated into 
greater implication in Filipino domestic political life. For example, the opposition to the 
present president, Arroyo, is less extraterritorial than was the case with Marcos or even 
Estrada. Yet the weakness of the relay function in the Filipino case compared to say, the 
Indian case, is not so much a result of inadequacies in the Filipino state, but rather the 
relative unimportance of the Philippines within the international environment. Nevertheless, 
in the United States in particular, pro-Philippines advocacy groups do have some resonance 
in Washington and have been particularly harnessed by presidents since Marcos, in ensuring 
continued US aid for example. Finally, the interlocutor function has come to the fore during the 
Arroyo presidency. On the one hand, each of her overseas trips is marked by well-publicized 
meetings with members of the local Filipino community in order to engage them as actors 
of development, or at least growth, domestically. Moreover, as the legislation protecting 
and promoting the welfare of OFWs and the liberalization of citizenship laws indicates, a 
preoccupation with the external has become a key issue within internal Filipino politics. The 
Filipinos’ vibrant civil society has generated a number of migrant rights advocacy groups 
to whom, in a sense, the Filipino state has “sub-contracted” a number of its priorities. In 
other words, these national bodies are key actors internally in the co-optation of the Filipino 
diaspora. 
CoNCLUSioNS: TowARDS BiNARy NATioNALiSmS
   In the preamble to this study, the question was raised as to the pertinence of concepts such 
as “state”, “diaspora” and “transnationalism” in analyzing social and economic relations 
between a sending country and its communities overseas. In focusing both on the policies 
and the praxis of Filipino governmental bodies in relation to emigrant communities (both of 
a permanent and temporary kind), this paper has suggested that at least the first two concepts 
of “state” and “diaspora” are indeed helpful. For the concept of “state”, this usefulness is 
conditional on conceiving the state as an actor whose role is variable and fluid depending on 
the particular sector examined. Emigration provides a case in which a state, often described 
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globally as weak, namely that of the Philippines, is able to display strong interventionist 
tendencies. This strength, it was argued, is related to the degree of embeddedness within 
Filipino society. In particular, the co-optation of numerous civil society actors as bridge-
builders between the Philippines and its overseas communities has facilitated the integration 
of Filipinos overseas within a state-led development, or at least growth strategy. However, 
the externally generated nature of this developmental strategy has for some civil society 
actors meant internally generated development (as opposed merely to growth) has been 
neglected by the Filipino state.
   The second conceptual question posed by this paper concerns the appropriateness of 
“diaspora” as a term to categorize overseas Filipino communities. By referring to a template 
of typologies elaborated by Robin Cohen, it has been suggested that overseas Filipino 
communities display, albeit in diffuse and diluted forms, many of the attributes of the five 
ideal types of diaspora he has postulated. Nevertheless, it is argued that there is a tendency 
to qualify as “diasporic” communities as diverse as itinerant sea-based workers or short-term 
contract workers in the Middle East on the one hand, and permanent emigrants in Europe 
and naturalized US citizens of Filipino origins in the United States on the other. These 
categorizations also have been watered down by a degree of fluidity between temporary and 
permanent emigrant status. A number of semantic permutations have been underlined. That, 
for example involving the changing of the term OCW (Overseas Contract Worker) to that 
of OFW (Overseas Filipino Worker) to designate temporary emigrants from the Philippines 
employed overseas. This involved a semantic “renationalization” of this population: while 
the term OFW should strictly speaking refer to deployed workers registered with the POEA, 
it has come to is used in a way that allows irregular emigrants (i.e. those without work 
contracts) to be brought back, so to speak, into the bosom of the Filipino nation.
   The increasingly popular usage of the expression “diaspora” over the last five years has 
served a similar function. By classifying and, thus, co-opting temporary and permanent 
emigrants into the same broad category, even those who no longer possess Filipino nationality 
(either because of opting for another citizenship or merely because they of second- or third-
generation Filipino origin) can be portrayed as part of the same Filipino family.20 Attributing 
membership within a diaspora to Filipinos overseas incidentally demonstrates the role of 
the observer in not only defining, but also in providing a mobilizing mantra to those they 
observe. Ultimately, a Filipino diaspora exists because social scientists and journalists (many 
of whom are Filipino-Americans) deem it exists. However, this does not explain the adoption 
by the Filipino state of the language of diaspora. Two explanations have been posited. The 
first is encrusted within the political economy of remittances, that is the realization vectored 
by the major international organizations that financial transfers of overseas populations to 
their home country now exceed foreign public development assistance to those countries. 
Re-labelling, so to speak, the emigrant as diasporic is to make him or her an actor in the 
domestic economy. Moreover, his/her role as a political actor “back home” is legitimized in 
     20 The use of such gender-loaded terms as “bosom” and “family” is deliberate, for the imagery of the Filipino 
nation articulated by the Filipino state is very much that of the motherland and the extended Filipino family.
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ways that the emigrant viewed as somehow a traitor does not allow.21 Both the introduction 
of voting procedures for Filipinos overseas and also a change in legislation to allow dual 
citizenship indicate that it is the Filipino state that determines some of the most important 
parameters of a diasporic existence.
   The final concept whose usefulness we sought to examine is that of “transnationalism”. 
The preceding examination of the Filipino situation would indicate two fundamental flaws in 
the notion: On the one hand, from an etymological perspective a root “nationalism” (defined 
as devotion to, and willingness to sacrifice for a nation) is elusive. On the other hand, the 
“trans” aspect of transnationalism, in the sense of a transcendence of the national, is even 
more questionable. Rather, the members of the Filipino diaspora would seem to possess 
multiple identities that not only evolve over time, but are subject to the vicissitudes of lived 
experience in home and host countries. This is hardly an earth-shaking discovery. Rather 
than supporting narratives of transnationalism, the Filipino case would indicate adherence to 
multiple, and above all, dual localisms, most forcefully displayed by Filipino-Americans. For 
those of Filipino origin who would see themselves as global citizens, it is difficult to see how 
an invocation of transnationalism adds anything to the more historically grounded concept 
of cosmopolitanism. Aiwa Ong’s (1999) exploration of flexible citizenship and diasporic 
membership as negotiated and fluctuating phenomena offers a more promising path in the 
study of emigrant communities. To use the title of an important collection of articles on the 
Filipino diaspora, Filipinos may feel themselves“ at home in the world” (Aguilar 2002), but, 
we would suggest, this sense of belongingness involves not a hypothetical transnationalism 
but rather a kind of “long-distance nationalism“ and/or “binary nationalisms” that allow the 
diasporic individual to be both here and there simultaneously.22
   In short, what appears to be lacking in conceptions of transnationalism is the sense of 
varied and diverse rootedness that the diasporic communities experience. Does a dual-
citizenship Filipino-American, for example, feel a sense of dual loyalties and allegiances, 
a kind of dual nationalism, concomitant with his/her dual citizenship? Or what is the sense 
of identity and loyalty for someone who is simply an American citizen, but who feels a 
“home” is elsewhere? Perhaps dual nationalisms are not contradictory but share a symbiotic 
relationship. Moreover, the holding of two passports is not a prerequisite for such dualities. 
Filipino contract workers in the Middle East or domestic workers elsewhere in Asia find 
themselves part of an externalized Filipino nation precisely because of their expatriation. 
Back in the Philippines, their sense of roots and identity would be much more locally defined 
      21 A comparison can be made with the Vietnamese situation, where, despite some attempts to encourage 
investment and remittances from the Viet Kieu, the latter are still regarded with some suspicion and not integrated 
into the Vietnamese policy.
      22 In some cases a kind of “biglocalism” could be invoked, a concept derived from the rather awkward notion 
of “glocalization”, i.e. the perception of living in both a globalized world and very locally at the same time. Forms 
of popular culture shared by Filipinos and Americans may enter this category for they are both locally grounded 
but also “universal” at the same time. 
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in regional or linguistic terms. Overseas, the host society, reinforced by the state apparatus, 
disregards linguistic, regional and other differences to reify these individuals as one people, 
Filipinos.23 
   In order to better understand these complexities, as well as in order to encompass the role 
of the state, the notion of binary nationalisms has been posited in this extended essay as a 
contribution to our understanding of diaspora. By binary nationalism, it is suggested a double-
mirrored identity in which a sense of one identity is contingent on a sense of the other, leading 
to dual – and indeed multiple – senses of non-exclusive loyalties. Such binary nationalisms 
would seem to preclude the transcendence of nation that transnationalism should logically 
imply, while at the same time not being anathema to rooted cosmopolitan ideals of global 
citizenship. Nevertheless, as it has been attempted to demonstrate from the Filipino case, it is 
not only the receiving state, but also the sending state that determines, to a large extent, both 
the ideational parameters, and the practical expressions, of such binary nationalisms.24
       23 An analogy can be made with the situation of “Italians” in the United States in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, prior to Italian unification. It was in exile so to speak, that these people “discovered” that as well as being 
Tuscans, Venetians or Neapolitans, etc. they were also Italians (Choate 2008). 
     24 Even in a short preliminary overview study such as this, many debts have been incurred. The first is to 
Maruja M.B. (Marla) Asis at the Scalabrini Migration Centre in Quezon City who not only allowed me to use the 
resources of the centre, but was unstinting both with her time and her advice. Claire-Noelle Simon, at present 
in Manila, has been remarkably understanding and generous in responding in record time to constant requests 
for journal articles, books and other documentation. Her Masters dissertation (Simon 2008) on the role of the 
Filipino education system in relation to emigration provides further evidence of the impact of the Filipino state 
in constructing its diaspora. Thirdly my gratitude to Sonny Africa and his colleagues at IBON for permission to 
reproduce a number of tables published previously in IBON (2008). Finally, I express much appreciation for the 
useful and largely constructive comments and suggestions of three anonymous referees. The usual caveats apply.
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Table 1 : A Typology of Roles of the Embedded Developmental State 
 
 
1. Custodian 
A variation of the conventional role of regulator, this involves regulatory efforts that 
privilege policing over promotion. 
 
2. Demiurge 
A variation of the conventional role of producer this involves the production and 
distribution of certain types of public goods (infrastructure, education) involving an 
extension to compete in markets in producing normal “private” goods. 
 
3. Midwifery 
Rather than substituting itself for private producers the state tries to assist in the 
emergence of new entrepreneurial groups and/or the reorientation of such groups 
into new areas of production. 
 
4. Husbandry 
This function overlaps with that of midwife; however, it involves activities from 
cajoling through a variety of incentives (or punishments) to the setting up of state 
organizations to take on risky tasks, such as research and development. 
 
Source: Adapted from Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States & Industrial Transformation, Princeton NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1995. 
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Source:  World Bank, Migration and Remittances Factbook, 2008, 
New York, 2008
Source:  World Bank, Migration and Remittances Factbook, 2008, 
New York, 2008
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Table 6 : A Typology of Forms of State-Diaspora Co-optation
1. Resource husbandry
a. Economic: instrument of a development strategy (or lack thereof?).
b.	 Political:	financing	political	activity	and/or	intellectual/moral	legitimizing	
inputs.
2. As Outlet
a.	 Rewarding	the	docile	and/or	support	networks.
b. Social safety valve.
3. As Relay
a. Vector in foreign relations.
b.	 Extra-territorialized	lobbying	and	interest	groups.	
4. As Interlocutor 
a.	 Externally:	a	deterritorialized	“domestic”	constituency.
b. Internally: external representatives of domestic diaspora-linked actors
Source: Adapted from Ingrid Therwath, L’Etat face à la diaspora : stratégies et trajectoires indiennes, 
unpublished PhD dissertation, Sciences Po, 2007 with additional insights from Nana Oishi, Women in 
Motion:	Globalization,	State	Policies	and	Labor	Migration	in	Asia,	Stanford	CA:	Stanford	University	Press	
2005	and	Robyn	Rodriguez,	“Migrant	Heroes:	Nationalism,	Citizenship	and	the	Politics	of	Filipino	Migrant	
Labor”,	Citizenship	Studies	6	(3)	2002,	pp.	341-356.	
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